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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To project the potential economic impact of pandemic inﬂu-
enza mitigation strategies from a societal perspective in the United States.
Methods: We use a stochastic agent-based model to simulate pandemic
inﬂuenza in the community. We compare 17 strategies: targeted antiviral
prophylaxis (TAP) alone and in combination with school closure as well as
prevaccination.
Results: In the absence of intervention, we predict a 50% attack rate with
an economic impact of $187 per capita as loss to society. Full TAP (FTAP)
is the most effective single strategy, reducing number of cases by 54% at
the lowest cost to society ($127 per capita). Prevaccination reduces
number of cases by 48% and is the second least costly alternative ($140
per capita). Adding school closure to FTAP or prevaccination further
improves health outcomes but increases total cost to society by approxi-
mately $2700 per capita.
Conclusion: FTAP is an effective and cost-saving measure for mitigating
pandemic inﬂuenza.
Keywords: computer simulation, cost–beneﬁt analysis, economics, human
disease outbreaks, inﬂuenza, pharmaceutical models, theoretical.
Introduction
Inﬂuenza pandemic preparedness is a public health priority in
light of the global epidemic of highly pathogenic H5N1 inﬂuenza
infection in avian populations. Recent epidemiological models
have explored various mitigation strategies for pandemic inﬂu-
enza in the United States. This research has shown the likely
effectiveness of targeted antiviral use, low-efﬁcacy vaccines, and
nonmedical interventions such as school closure, case isolation,
and household quarantine in reducing peak or cumulative illness
attack rates, even for highly transmissible viruses [1,2]. Further
modeling work highlights the importance of targeted antiviral
use and social distancing measures [3], and has helped inform the
US pandemic inﬂuenza plan [4].
Nevertheless, an important missing component is a cost-
effectiveness analysis of proposed mitigation strategies [5]. Many
economic evaluations of interpandemic inﬂuenza programs do
not take into account the dynamic, nonlinear effects of interven-
tions in infectious diseases, likely underestimating the cost-
effectiveness of interventions [6].
Our objective was to evaluate the cost utility of alternative
pandemic inﬂuenza mitigation strategies in the United States
from the societal perspective using a stochastic, individual-level,
microsimulation model [7]. We examined the cost utility of
targeted antiviral prophylaxis (TAP), school closure, and pre-
vaccination with low-efﬁcacy vaccines. The time horizon of
the analysis was 6 months, which reﬂects the time until a fully
matched vaccine would be available in sufﬁcient quantities to
effectively protect the population. To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst economic evaluation of inﬂuenza pandemic mitigation strat-
egies based on a dynamic inﬂuenza transmission model. The
research also expands on current epidemiological models by
incorporating severity of inﬂuenza illness, complications, mortal-
ity, and quality of life.
Methods
Strategies
This article focuses on strategies that were shown to
be the most promising ones in previously published inﬂuenza
pandemic models [1,3,7]. We compared the economic impact of
no intervention with 16 single and combination strategies
(Table 1). Single prophylactic strategies included prevaccination,
antiviral post-exposure prophylaxis (in combination with treat-
ment of the index case), and school closure. TAP included
household-only prophylaxis [household targeted antiviral post-
exposure prophylaxis (HTAP)], and prophylaxis in the full set of
contact groups for an index case [full targeted antiviral post-
exposure prophylaxis (FTAP)]. Oseltamivir stockpiles in varying
quantities were assumed to be available from the start of a
pandemic, ranging from covering 25% of the total population
(a single course of oseltamivir, one pack, consists of 10 capsules,
enough for 5 days of treatment or 10 days of postexposure
prophylaxis) to an “unlimited” stockpile (i.e., as much as
needed). TAP was carried out by treating identiﬁed index cases
(the ﬁrst symptomatic illness in a contact group) and offering
post-exposure prophylaxis to contacts of these index cases in
households, neighborhood clusters, large day-care centers, small
playgroups, schools, and workgroups. We assumed that 60% of
symptomatic index cases could be ascertained [8]. We also
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evaluated a treatment-only strategy, i.e., only individuals with
symptomatic illness are treated with antivirals.
Prevaccination assumes that 70% of the population are
successfully vaccinated with a low-efﬁcacy vaccine, before the
outbreak of a pandemic. We also considered school closure
as a measure of social distancing alone, or in combination with
pharmaceutical interventions. We modeled the impact of closing
schools for the duration of the pandemic (26 weeks).
Mathematical Model
We used a discrete-time, stochastic simulation model of inﬂuenza
spread within a structured population to compare the effective-
ness of various intervention strategies [7]. A recent publication
demonstrates the comparability of our model predictions (inﬂu-
enza attack rate) to other published models [3]. The model
simulates stochastic spread of inﬂuenza in a population of people
interacting in known contact groups [7–9]. Each person is
assumed to have daily contacts with household members and
people in the three closest households (neighborhood cluster), as
well as with people in the larger neighborhood and community.
Preschool children attend either small playgroups or larger
day-care centers, school-age children attend elementary, middle,
or high school, as appropriate, and 63% of adults are in
workgroups [10].
Once infected, people follow the clinical pathway as shown in
Figure 1. An infected person may receive treatment, which modi-
ﬁes health outcome (probability of otitis media, bronchitis, pneu-
monia, hospitalization due to inﬂuenza, mortality) and resource
use (probability of health-care contact). Stratiﬁcation of the
population by age and risk status is accounted for in the model.
The age groups are children 0–4 years old, children 5–18 years,
younger adults (19–64 years old), and older adults (65 years).
Younger adults are further stratiﬁed into high and low risk.
High-risk adults have underlying chronic conditions (e.g.,
cardiovascular, respiratory, or metabolic disease), which increase
their risk for bronchitis, pneumonia, hospitalizations, and
mortality.
Data
Transmission
Many of the transmission parameters were adopted from previ-
ous work [7–9]. The probability that an infected individual will
be symptomatic is 0.67 [11]. An asymptomatic infection is
assumed to be 50% as infectious as a symptomatic infection
[7,12].
One hundred runs were performed for each intervention, and
the results were averaged. The average R0 was 2.0, with a range
of 1.5 to 2.6. R0 is deﬁned as the average number of secondary
infections produced by a typical infected person in a fully sus-
ceptible population [13].
Probabilities of Events
Probabilities of events used in the model are shown in supplemen-
tary Table A2. The probabilities of bronchitis, pneumonia, and
otitis media for an untreated population were based on a large
general practice database from the UK [19]. The mortality rate is
based on data from previous pandemics [20] and captures all
inﬂuenza-related deaths, including those due to complications.
Effectiveness of Interventions
We used current estimates of antiviral efﬁcacy of oseltamivir
(Table 2) [11,14–17]. The antiviral efﬁcacy for symptomatic
disease given exposure is 0.72, and weassumed that the antiviral
efﬁcacy for infectiousness is 0.62 [17]. Oseltamivir treatment
effectively reduces incidence of otitis media, bronchitis, pneumo-
nia, inﬂuenza-related hospitalizations, and mortality, and
improves quality of life [18,21–23].
For a low-efﬁcacy vaccine, we assumed the vaccine efﬁcacy
for susceptibility to infection to be 0.30, and vaccine efﬁcacy for
infectiousness to be 0.50 [12]. We assumed that two doses of
vaccine would be needed [24].
Utilities
We calculated quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) based on
quality weights between 0 (death) and 1 (perfect health). The
QALY penalties for inﬂuenza were derived from clinical trial data
as used and described in a recently published health technology
assessment on the prevention and control of inﬂuenza [21] and
for bronchitis and otitis media from the literature [25,26] There
were no quality weights published for bronchitis; we therefore
assumed the same QALY penalty for bronchitis as for inﬂuenza.
Future life-years were discounted at 3% per annum in line with
US guidelines for economic evaluations [27].
Table 1 Description of interventions
Intervention Description
No intervention No prevaccination, prophylaxis or treatment with antivirals
HTAP25 Household targeted antiviral prophylaxis, stockpile for 25% of population
HTAP50 Household targeted antiviral prophylaxis, stockpile for 50% of population
HTAP Household targeted antiviral prophylaxis, stockpile unlimited
FTAP25 Full targeted antiviral prophylaxis (household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts), stockpile for 25% of population
FTAP50 Full targeted antiviral prophylaxis (household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts), stockpile for 50% of population
FTAP Full targeted antiviral prophylaxis (household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts), stockpile unlimited
Prevaccination Prevaccinating 70% of population with low-efﬁcacy vaccine
School closure Closing all schools for 26 weeks
HTAP25 + school closure Household targeted antiviral prophylaxis, stockpile for 25% of population, plus closing all schools for 26 weeks
HTAP50 + school closure Household targeted antiviral prophylaxis, stockpile for 50% of population, plus closing all schools for 26 weeks
HTAP + school closure Household targeted antiviral prophylaxis, stockpile unlimited, plus closing all schools for 26 weeks
FTAP25 + school closure Full targeted antiviral prophylaxis (household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts), stockpile for 25% of population,
plus closing all schools for 26 weeks
FTAP50 + school closure Full targeted antiviral prophylaxis (household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts), stockpile for 50% of population,
plus closing all schools for 26 weeks
FTAP + school closure Full targeted antiviral prophylaxis (household contacts and 60% of work/school contacts), stockpile unlimited, plus closing all
schools for 26 weeks
Prevaccination + school closure Prevaccinating 70% of population with low-efﬁcacy vaccine, plus closing all schools for 26 weeks
Treatment only Treating all cases with antivirals
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Costs
Resource use. We estimated resource use related to treatment of
illness separately for children and adults, as well as resource use
related to prophylaxis including school closure. We included
physician visits, hospitalizations, use of antibiotics, and use of
over-the-counter medicines. For prevaccination and TAP, we
included both drug and delivery costs. For HTAP, we estimated
travel and time cost to obtain prophylaxis, and assigned this cost
once per household, assuming that the index case obtains pro-
phylaxis for household members. For FTAP, we assumed three
times this cost to account for prophylaxis of household members,
contacts in the school or workplace, and contacts in the
community.
We assume 2.5 days of work loss per week per household for
children <12 years if 1) the child is sick; or 2) schools are closed.
This estimate is based on best available data from the literature
[10,21,28,29]. Babysitting pools or other similar arrangements
should be avoided during a pandemic when school closure is in
effect to minimize transmission.
For school closure, we assumed 2.5 person days per week
time loss for affected households, and 5 days per week for teach-
ers and other professionals, using a national ratio of teachers and
other professionals per student [30]. If one parent stays home
already because of a sick child, no additional work loss is added.
For teachers and other school staff who are parents, the work
loss is 5 days.
Unit costs. Unit medical cost estimates were based on US fee and
price schedules [27,31]. Oseltamivir is priced at the stockpile
acquisition cost for adults and children. Oseltamivir costs were
converted from euros to US dollars using the Interbank rate as of
July 5, 2006 [32]. The low-efﬁcacy vaccine is priced at one-third
of the current price per dose [31]. Because mass vaccination is
anticipated to be less costly than current vaccination practices,
we assumed only 50% of the usual cost for vaccine delivery. We
added 20% to both oseltamivir and vaccine cost to reﬂect the
cost incurred by the government for storage and distribution.
Hospitalization costs were derived from Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) codes [33] for children (0–17 years) and adults
(17 years) with (used for high-risk adults and older adults) and
without complications (used for low-risk adults). In the absence
of a DRG code for inﬂuenza, we assumed hospitalization costs
for inﬂuenza to be similar to bronchitis.
We valued productivity loss using the human capital
approach by applying average compensation (salary plus fringe
beneﬁts) [34] to days of work lost for sick adults and caregivers
of sick children, as well as caregivers for households affected by
school closure. We used average earnings for teachers [35] to
value work loss for teachers due to school closure. Productivity
loss because of premature mortality was not included because
this is reﬂected in the measure of health outcomes (QALYs)
[33].
Because resource use and cost data on health-care services
used during an inﬂuenza pandemic are not readily available,
Figure 1 Simpliﬁed schematic representation of
decision model. The “prophylaxis” arm extends in
identical format to the “nonprophylaxis” arm. The
“treatment” arm extends in identical format to the
“no treatment” arm.
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some of the estimates are assumptions based on the available
literature on annual inﬂuenza and expert opinion.
Analyses
Base-Case
In the base-case analysis, we estimated the expected health out-
comes (number of cases, number of deaths, QALYs) and costs
from the societal perspective for one pandemic wave, assuming a
death rate of 2.5% per inﬂuenza case. We chose the societal
perspective to capture productivity loss due to potentially very
high absenteeism rates and the potential impact due to school
closure, which do not incur any costs to the health-care payer,
but may cause substantial disruption. Because quality of life is
important to patients and decision-makers, we ranked strategies
by expected QALYs and performed a cost-utility analysis, calcu-
lating costs per QALY gained. This approach also enables com-
parison with other public health interventions. In the base-case,
costs were not discounted because all costs occur within 1 year.
Sensitivity Analyses
As the sensitivity related to the effectiveness of oseltamivir has
been tested and reported previously [1,7,12], we focused our
analysis on a number of other key variables in the model (R0,
mortality, school closure, and probability of a pandemic). We
explored the lower end of the possible range for the basic repro-
duction number by ﬁxing R0 at 1.6, and also investigated a
situation with R0 ﬁxed at 2.0 to address the effects of uncertainty
surrounding R0.
To assess the sensitivity of results to variations in health-care
resource use, we deﬁne a low-intensity and high-intensity
resource use scenario, varying a number of resource use param-
eters at the same time.
Severity of a pandemic is difﬁcult to predict; we therefore
tested a 5%mortality rate. To minimize social disruption because
of school closure, staff—i.e., teachers and other professionals—
may be assigned to different tasks, such as teaching by distance or
supporting health-care workers and other essential services. We
assumed 50% productivity loss for teachers and other staff
during school closure, instead of 100% in the base case.
There is an additional sensitivity analysis (reported in the
supplementary materials), assuming a pandemic occurs within 33
years, and that stockpiles need to be renewed.
Results
Base-Case
All base-case results are shown in Table 3. In the absence of any
intervention, we projected an illness attack rate of 50%, resulting
in 13 deaths per 1000 population. All interventions reduced the
illness attack rate and hence morbidity and mortality. Many
interventions are also cost saving compared with no intervention,
meaning that additional costs of intervention (antivirals, vaccine)
are offset by the lower number of cases requiring treatment and
incurring productivity loss. FTAP is the most effective single
strategy, reducing the attack rate by 54%. If a low-efﬁcacy vaccine
is available and administered before the onset of the pandemic,
then, prevaccinating 70% of the population is expected to reduce
Table 2 Effectiveness of interventions
Intervention
Incidence reduction/
QoL improvement (%) Source
Oseltamivir
Infection given exposure 30 Halloran et al. 2007 [11], Hayden et al. 1999 [16], Hayden et al. 2000 [14],
Welliver et al. 2001 [15],Yang et al. 2006 [17]
Symptomatic disease given infection 60 Halloran et al. 2007 [11], Hayden et al. 1999 [16], Hayden et al. 2000 [14],
Welliver et al. 2001 [15],Yang et al. 2006 [17]
Symptomatic disease given exposure 72 Calculated
Infectiousness 62 Yang et al. 2006 [17]
Low-efﬁcacy vaccine
Susceptibility to infection 30 Longini et al. 2005 [12]
Infectiousness 50 Longini et al. 2005 [12]
Bronchitis
Children <5 years 52 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Children 5–18 years 52 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Low-risk younger adults 60 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
High-risk younger adults 33 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Older adults 33 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Pneumonia
Children <5 years 63 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Children 5–18 years 63 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Low-risk younger adults 85 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
High-risk younger adults 24 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Older adults 24 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Otitis media
Children <5 years 62 Data on ﬁle
Inﬂuenza deaths (all) Same as reduction
in hospitalizations
Assumption
Inﬂuenza hospitalizations
Children 61 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Low-risk younger adults 64 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
High-risk younger adults 39 Kaiser et al. 2003 [18]
Older adults 39 Kaiser et al. 2003 [21]
QoL improvement (inﬂuenza)
Children and low-risk younger adults 11 Data on ﬁle
High-risk younger adults 4 Data on ﬁle
Older adults 5 Data on ﬁle
QoL, quality of life.
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the number of cases by 48% and is the second least costly strategy.
FTAP, however, dominates (i.e., has the lowest morbidity, mortal-
ity, and costs) all single strategies andmost combination strategies,
which are therefore eliminated from further analysis. The
expected illness attack rate is smallest (6% and 4%, respectively)
if either 60% of close contacts of ascertained index cases receive
prophylaxis (FTAP), or 70% of the population is prevaccinated
with a low-efﬁcacy vaccine, and schools are closed for the duration
of the outbreak. School closure, however, incurs high costs to
society (about $2.7 million per 1000 population). Total costs are
therefore much higher than for FTAP or prevaccination alone.
Strategies involving school closure are approximately 14 to 21
times as costly as single intervention strategies with antivirals or
prevaccination.
Table 4 shows the results for the incremental cost-utility
analysis. Eliminating all dominated interventions leaves only
three strategies for comparison: FTAP, FTAP in combination with
school closure, and prevaccination in combination with school
closure. Compared to FTAP not involving school closure, FTAP
plus school closure or prevaccination plus school closure gains
51 QALYs, but increases total cost by approximately $2.5
million for a population of 1000. School closure incurs substan-
tial costs to society, driven by extensive work loss for carers and
teachers. The incremental cost-utility ratio (ICUR) for either
strategy compared to FTAP is $48,500/QALY gained. Figure 2
shows the cost-effective frontier. The options connected by a line
are the set of potentially optimal choices. All other options are
dominated, i.e., not as effective and more costly.
Sensitivity Analyses
The basic reproductive number is a key driver in the model,
because it determines the number of inﬂuenza cases, and there-
fore the subsequent impact on the economy. It also affects the
relative effect of the different interventions. Fixing R0 at 2.0 does
not change the ranking of strategies compared to the base-case.
FTAP remains the most effective (26 of the 100 cases) and least
costly single strategy ($140/capita). This is despite the fact that it
is estimated to consume almost three packs on average per
capita. As in the base-case, the school closure strategies are very
expensive from the society’s perspective, but adding school
closure to any FTAP strategy or to prevaccination effectively
eliminates the pandemic (0.2 to 7 cases per 100). If school closure
is added to FTAP, no more than about 50% antiviral stockpiling
is needed to effectively control the pandemic. For a low R0 of 1.6,
a pandemic can be effectively controlled with FTAP25. The cost
savings are also highest for this scenario, with a cost of $3/capita
compared with $130/capita for baseline.
Variations in health-care resource use have some impact on
the cost-utility ratios but not the ranking of strategies. In the
best-case scenario (low resource use for treatment of inﬂuenza
cases), the ICUR for FTAP plus school closure, and vaccination
plus school closure compared to FTAP alone is just below
$28,000 per QALY gained. For the worst-case scenario (high
resource use for treatment of inﬂuenza cases), the ICUR for FTAP
plus school closure, and vaccination plus school closure com-
pared to FTAP alone is below $83,000/QALY.
Table 3 Base-case results (ranked by expected QALYs)
Intervention
Illness attack
rate (%)
Deaths
per 1000
QALYs*
per 1000
Incremental
QALYs† per 1000
Courses
per 1000
Total cost in million
$ per 1000
No intervention 50 13 21,141 — — 0.19
FTAP25 48 12 21,157 16 246 0.18
FTAP50 45 11 21,175 34 481 0.18
HTAP25 48 11 21,181 40 250 0.19
School closure 39 10 21,210 69 — 2.72
HTAP50 42 8 21,239 98 498 0.17
Treatment only 49 8 21,241 100 243 0.19
HTAP 41 7 21,264 123 651 0.17
Prevaccination 26 6 21,271 130 — 0.14
HTAP25 and school closure 31 7 21,273 132 204 2.70
FTAP25 and school closure 23 6 21,300 159 150 2.66
FTAP50 and school closure 22 5 21,310 169 279 2.66
HTAP50 and school closure 27 5 21,316 175 374 2.68
HTAP and school closure 24 4 21,330 189 395 2.67
FTAP 23 5 21,351 210 2,447 0.12
FTAP and school closure 6 1 21,403 262 640 2.61
Prevaccination and school closure 4 1 21,403 262 — 2.62
*Expected average quality-adjusted life expectancy.
†Compared with no intervention.
Note: QALY ranking differs slightly from illness attack rate ranking because QALYs take into account the differences in morbidity and mortality (life expectancy) across age groups, i.e., it is
important in which age groups cases and deaths occur.
HTAP, household targeted antiviral prophylaxis; FTAP, full targeted antiviral prophylaxis; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
Table 4 Incremental cost utility for noneliminated strategies (pandemic occurs within 1 year)
Intervention
Total cost in million
$ per 1000
Incremental cost in
million $ per 1000 QALYs per 1000
Incremental
QALYs per 1000
Incremental cost-utility
ratio ($)
FTAP 0.12 — 21,352 — —
FTAP and school closure 2.73 2.48 21,403 51 48,472
Prevaccination and school closure 2.73 2.50 21,403 51 48,638
Note: FTAP plus school closure and prevaccination plus school closure are individually compared to the same baseline (FTAP).
FTAP, full targeted antiviral prophylaxis; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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The ranking of strategies is unaffected when changing assump-
tions about mortality and school closure. Assuming a higher case
fatality rate of 5%, the ICUR for FTAP plus school closure, and
vaccination plus school closure compared to FTAP reduces from
$48,500/QALY to $18,500/QALY gained,making these strategies
more attractive at higher mortality rates. When teachers and
professionals incur only half the productivity loss, ICURs are only
slightly lower than in the base case ($41,500/QALY for FTAP/
vaccination plus school closure compared to FTAP). This is
because most of the productivity loss (60%) during school closure
can be attributed to parents (carers) being unable to work.
Our analysis indicates that the higher the attack rate, the
more worthwhile are interventions providing broad coverage,
such as school closure, FTAP, and prevaccination. At low attack
rates, targeted strategies provide similar effects, but at lower cost.
Discussion
The base-case analysis clearly demonstrates that both FTAP and
prepandemic vaccination effectively reduce the burden of pan-
demic inﬂuenza. In comparison with no intervention, both are
cost saving from a societal perspective, the costs of the interven-
tion (i.e., stockpiling up to 2.5 courses of antivirals per capita or
prevaccinating 70% of the population) being more than offset by
the substantial savings made in terms of both health-care costs
and productivity losses. Further reductions in infection rate, mor-
bidity, and mortality can be achieved by the addition of school
closure to these strategies, but at a much higher cost to society
(approximately 14 to 21 times that of a single intervention).
Nevertheless, because of the further beneﬁts realized in terms
of health outcomes, with the addition of school closure in this
setting, this approach could still be cost-effective (~$48,500/
QALY gained) from a societal perspective.
To our knowledge, this study represents the ﬁrst economic
analysis of pandemic mitigation strategies using a dynamic non-
linear model. Although the analysis has a number of limitations
due to uncertainties about factors such as the characteristics
(infectivity and associated morbidity/mortality) of the pandemic
strain and the current feasibility of some of the mitigation strat-
egies evaluated (e.g., timely availability/efﬁcacy of a pandemic
vaccine), this analysis provides an important economic evalua-
tion of a number of relevant mitigation strategies that may be
considered in the event of a pandemic.
Because the severity of a future pandemic is unknown, we used
a distribution for R0 (~1.5 to 2.6), the basic reproduction number,
to account for this uncertainty. Our results, therefore, reﬂect what
to expect on average. There is a strong R0 threshold just under 2.0,
below which interventions aimed at the population at large (pre-
vaccination, school closure) are less valuable. In addition, R0 also
has an impact on the quantity of antivirals required to mitigate a
pandemic outbreak, the number of doses used exhibiting a highly
nonlinear dynamic threshold. Thus, given the uncertainty regard-
ing R0, our base-case analysis best captures the information
required for pandemic planning.
The current analysis is based on the assumption that the
required quantity of either pandemic vaccine or oseltamivir is
available for timely use. This requires adequate stockpiling in
advance of an epidemic. For prevaccination in the model, it is
assumed that 70% of the population are vaccinated with a low-
efﬁcacy vaccine at least 14 days before exposure to the virus.
Although vaccination would, in principle, be a very effective
intervention in the event of a pandemic, signiﬁcant limitations to
this approach exist in terms of the degree of virus strain match,
production capacity, and shelf life. These, together with the con-
stantly changing antigenic nature of the virus, would adversely
affect both the opportunity for advanced stockpiling and the
required rapid availability of vaccines at the onset of a pandemic.
In contrast, oseltamivir is not strain-dependent and has a much
longer shelf life than pandemic vaccines. Although the emergence
of antiviral-resistant pandemic strains has been identiﬁed as a
potential issue, development of resistance to oseltamivir over
more than 7 years of use in epidemic inﬂuenza setting has been
very low. In addition, it has been suggested that based on the
reduced ﬁtness and thus low transmissibility of resistant strains
[36], the beneﬁts of oseltamivir are highly unlikely to be offset by
drug resistance.
To provide a national aggregate perspective on our estimates,
it is useful to compare them with estimates produced from aggre-
gate economic models. The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce esti-
mated that the impact of severe pandemic would reduce Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) by 4.25%, equivalent to a typical busi-
ness cycle recession [37]. With a projected GDP in the order of
$14 trillion, this would imply a loss of $595 billion. This
“severe” scenario, however, assumed an attack rate of 30% and
2 million deaths. Our base case scenario generates an attack rate
of 50% and a projected 3.9 million deaths. We estimate only the
direct and indirect costs related to medical treatment in this
scenario, and they amount to a projected $59 billion. School
closure dramatically increases the costs to $840 billion, reﬂecting
the broader economic impact of parents missing work to care for
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Figure 2 Cost-effectiveness frontier base-case.
1 = no intervention; 2 = HTAP25; 3 = HTAP50;
4 = HTAP; 5 = school closure; 6 = prevaccination;
7 = HTAP25 and school closure; 8 = HTAP50 and
school closure; 9 = HTAP and school closure;
10 = prevaccination and school closure; 11 = treat-
ment only; 12 = FTAP25; 13 = FTAP50; 14 = FTAP;
15 = FTAP25 and school closure: 16 = FTAP50 and
school closure.
HTAP = household targeted antiviral prophylaxis;
FTAP = full targeted antiviral prophylaxis; QALYs =
quality-adjusted life-year.
Inﬂuenza Pandemic Mitigation Strategies Economics 231
their children at home. By comparison, stockpiling one course of
antiviral treatment for every American would cost $7 billion for
the ﬁrst 5 years of coverage. FTAP alone would cost 2.5 times this
for the stockpile, and FTAP plus school closure would cost 64%
of this for the stockpile.
Conclusions
All interventions reduce the illness attack rate, morbidity, and
mortality. Many interventions are also cost saving compared
with no intervention. Stockpiling TAP in the event of a pandemic
is cost saving to the society, and will avoid loss of life. Adding
school closure provides the greatest beneﬁt and is likely to be an
attractive strategy if transmission and mortality rates are high.
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